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RETROACTIVE JUSTICE: TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN RESENTENCING CRACK COCAINE
OFFENDERS UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE FIRST
STEP ACT
INTRODUCTION
In a rare bipartisan moment under the Trump presidency, Congress passed a celebrated criminal justice reform package, the
First Step Act of 2018.1 The law was necessary to begin remedying
decades of an unduly harsh and discriminatory drug sentencing
regime, which ushered in the era of mass incarceration.2 Section
404 of the First Step Act mitigates that injustice by allowing prisoners sentenced under the 100:1 crack cocaine to powder cocaine
sentencing ratio to move to be resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010’s 18:1 sentencing ratio.3
This reform holds great promise. Take, for example, the story of
Gary Rhines, who is heralded as the face of the First Step Act. 4
Mr. Rhines was a victim of society, forced to traffic drugs as a preteen to support parents struggling with addiction, who garnered a

1. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
2. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 59–60 (2010) (“Drug offenses alone account for two-thirds of the rise
in the federal inmate population and more than half of the rise in state prisoners between
1985 and 2000.”).
3. First Step Act of 2018 § 404, 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing
Act). While the United States Code refers to “cocaine base” and “cocaine hydrochloride,” this
Comment uses the common terms “crack cocaine” and “powder cocaine,” respectively. The
ratios reflect the quantity of powder cocaine needed to trigger the same mandatory minimum sentence as crack cocaine. Thus, under 100:1, 500 grams of powder cocaine triggered
the same five-year mandatory minimum sentence as five grams of crack cocaine. See AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 1302(a)(2), § 1010(b)(1)–(2), 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-15 to -17 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)). Under 18:1, the five-year mandatory
minimum triggering weight for crack cocaine is increased to twenty-eight grams. See Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 841).
4. Jesse Wegman, How Would You Spend a Life Sentence?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/opinion/first-step-act.html [https://perma.cc/QCC7-3A
VF].
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criminal record at a young age.5 Those prior offenses earned him a
mandatory life sentence at the age of twenty-eight, when he was
convicted as a participant in the sale of sixty-six grams of crack
cocaine.6 Though he stood no chance of regaining his freedom, Mr.
Rhines bettered himself over fourteen years in prison through drug
treatment, education, and professional training.7 In 2019, under
section 404 of the First Step Act, Mr. Rhines’s remaining sentence
was vacated, and he was resentenced to time served.8 Unfortunately, because of the law’s problematic and arbitrary implementation, Mr. Rhines’s story is not representative of most offenders
petitioning to be resentenced under section 404.
Section 404 is arbitrarily implemented because it is written ambiguously. The law leaves two open questions for courts to decide:
(1) the authority of the court to impose a new sentence or modify
the existing sentence, and (2) what updates in sentencing guidelines and caselaw to apply, if any.9 Regarding the first question, if
the court decides to impose a new sentence, it conducts a comprehensive review of the prisoner’s character, background, and rehabilitation, allowing the prisoner to fully present his case to the
court, as the court did in resentencing Mr. Rhines.10 In contrast, if
the court decides merely to modify the existing sentence, it defaults
to the findings of the original court, and denies the prisoner the
basic human dignity to be present at his own hearing and address
the court.11
In answering the second question, the court must decide
whether it will conduct a “time machine” resentencing and return
to the legal landscape at the time of the original conviction to resentence, or resentence according to present law at the time of the

Id.

5. Id.
6. Id. This drug quantity is approximately equivalent to the weight of a pack of M&Ms.

7. Id.
8. Id. While his federal sentence was thus completed, Pennsylvania incarcerated him
for one more year because his 1998 offense violated his parole. Id. He will be released in
October of 2020. Id.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at
*3–10 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
10. United States v. Rhines, No. 4:01-cr-310, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. May 31, 2019) (“[T]he only appropriate way to thoroughly evaluate Rhines’ characteristics . . . is to have him appear in open court and provide him with an opportunity to fully
allocute.”).
11. Compare id. at *5, with Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *8–9.
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defendant’s motion.12 Mr. Rhines was eligible for full relief because
the court chose not to use the time machine method.13 The court’s
choice to apply the time machine method or present law weighs
especially heavily on defendants who were originally sentenced as
“career offenders,” and those who had drug weights attributed to
them in the presentence report that were significantly greater than
the amount of the offense. These issues are particularly salient because they are legal issues which greatly enhance a defendant’s
sentence and are areas of law that have seen significant change in
the last decade.
The overlap of these two open questions has led to four different
methods of resentencing prisoners under section 404.14 In Method
I, the court imposes a new sentence, but applies the time machine
approach.15 Method II applies the more limited procedure of a sentence modification and the same time machine approach.16 Method
III again applies the more limited sentence modification, but rejects the time machine approach and modifies following current
law.17 Finally, in Method IV, courts impose a new sentence and apply all current sentencing guidelines and caselaw; this amounts to
a full plenary resentencing.18
In analyzing these four methods, this Comment argues that
Method IV best serves fundamental fairness in sentencing, in congruence with the purpose of the First Step Act. To resolve its arbitrary implementation, section 404 must be amended to require a
full plenary resentencing in accordance with all updated sentencing guidelines and caselaw in effect at the time of the resentencing.
This was the approach taken by the court in resentencing Mr.

12. Compare United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The district
court decides on a new sentence by placing itself in the time frame of the original sentencing,
altering the relevant legal landscape only by the changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.”), with Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *14 (“The Court will not climb
into a time machine and try to figure out what the government might have done years ago
when charging the defendant.”).
13. Rhines, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4–5.
14. The classifications of district court approaches to implementing section 404 as
Methods I, II, III, and IV are my own.
15. See, e.g., Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418–19.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, No. 8:08CR441, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592, at
*4–5 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2019).
17. See, e.g., Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *10, *14.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Payton, No. 07-20498-1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292,
at *10–12 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2019).
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Rhines to time served.19 While the Supreme Court could rule
Method IV is the correct interpretation of the statute, Congress is
the more appropriate actor and should capitalize on the present
appetite for reform to amend the law to accomplish its intent.
Part I of this Comment introduces the First Step Act, the goals
of Congress in implementing it, the historical context from which
it emerged, and the four methods by which it is being implemented.
Part II analyzes and evaluates Methods I–IV, arguing that Method
IV uniquely fulfills the goals of Congress. Part III proposes an
amendment to section 404 which would remove ambiguity and require courts to resentence according to Method IV. Lastly, this
Comment concludes with a summary of its argument and a call for
change.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The First Step Act of 2018
1. The Law
In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which “moderately
overhaul[ed] the criminal justice system . . . usher[ing] in small
changes to the ‘tough-on-crime’ prison and sentencing laws of the
1980s and 1990s that led to an explosion in federal prison populations and costs.”20 The law assists ex-offenders with reentry, creates good-time credit, reduces sentencing guidelines, and makes
certain reforms retroactive.21 An extraordinary bipartisan effort,
the First Step Act’s passage was a result of conservative fiscal concern for the budget required to sustain a prison population which
had ballooned to 220,000 in 2013, and a growing awareness among
progressives of the injustice of mass incarceration.22 Indicative of
19. United States v. Rhines, No. 4:01-cr-310, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4–5
(M.D. Pa. May 31, 2019); Wegman, supra note 4.
20. United States v. Simons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
21. First Step Act, ESP INSIDER EXPRESS (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Wash., D.C.), Feb.
2019, at 1 [hereinafter INSIDER EXPRESS], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/train
ing/newsletters/2019-special_FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A4R-J9UF].
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-699, at 23–24 (2018) (suggesting public safety is undermined
by the increasing percentage of the Department of Justice budget dedicated to prisons);
Vivian Ho, Criminal Justice Reform Bill Passed by Senate in Rare Bipartisan Victory,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2018, 7:29 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/
18/first-step-act-criminal-justice-reform-passes-senate
[https://perma.cc/WKD4-NB3B];
Wegman, supra note 4 (reporting 2013 prison population).
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the underlying racial dynamics, the growing impatience with criminalizing drug addiction is at least partially attributable to the opioid crisis ravaging white communities and causing a shift in perspective “from warfare to welfare.”23
Embodying the shift from war on drugs to treatment, Title IV of
the First Step Act addresses sentencing reform.24 Specifically, the
Act reduces and restricts enhanced mandatory minimums for prior
drug felonies (section 401), broadens the existing safety valve of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f), which increases the number of offenders that
courts are allowed to sentence without regard to mandatory minimums (section 402), and reduces the severity of “stacking” multiple
offenses involving firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (section 403).25
Subsequently, section 404 of the First Step Act makes the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive, allowing courts to reduce the
sentence of crack cocaine offenders sentenced under the old 100:1
scheme by instead applying the less harsh 18:1 ratio.26 This ratio
reflects the proportional drug weights of powder cocaine and crack
cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum.27 Thus, under
the 100:1 scheme it took only five grams of crack cocaine to trigger
the same five-year mandatory minimum as 500 grams of powder
cocaine.28 This is an egregious and discriminatory scheme, completely disproportional to the harm caused by what is essentially
the same drug.29 In 2010, Congress diminished this injustice by reducing the ratio to 18:1.30 Leaving the triggering powder cocaine

23. Jelani Jefferson Exum, From Warfare to Welfare: Reconceptualizing Drug Sentencing During the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 941, 952–54 (2019).
24. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, §§ 401–404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220–22
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841). In its other titles, First Step’s primary focus is reentry of people
who are incarcerated into society, “directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons to take specific
actions regarding programming, good-time credit, and compassionate release, among other
issues.” INSIDER EXPRESS, supra note 21, at 1.
25. First Step Act of 2018 §§ 401–403; see INSIDER EXPRESS, supra note 21, at 1.
26. First Step Act of 2018 § 404.
27. See supra note 3.
28. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 1302(a)(2), § 1010(b)(1)–
(2), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-15 to -17 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)). Additionally, fifty
grams of crack cocaine and 5000 grams of powder cocaine triggered the same ten-year mandatory minimum. Id.
29. Exum, supra note 23, at 948 (citing CARL L. HART, JOANNE CSETE & DON HABIBI,
OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., METHAMPHETAMINE: FACT VS. FICTION AND LESSONS FROM THE CRACK
HYSTERIA 2 (2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/methamphet
amine-dangers-exaggerated-20140218.pdf [https://perma.cc/79W6-JBN7]).
30. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841).
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weights unaltered, the law raised the crack cocaine weights to
twenty-eight grams and 280 grams.31
This new ratio is made retroactively available to prisoners in
section 404(b) of the First Step Act:
A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion
of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney
for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at
the time the covered offense was committed.32

A “covered offense” is one with penalties “modified by section 2
or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010” that was committed before
the Act was passed.33 The law gives prisoners only one opportunity
to move for relief under section 404, and courts retain discretion to
deny resentencing motions.34
At the time the First Step Act was passed in December 2018,
2660 offenders were eligible for relief under section 404.35 This is a
small percentage of the overall number of offenders impacted by
the First Step Act.36 However, this small segment is an especially
important segment because of who it represents: those offenders
sentenced under an unduly harsh scheme, the overwhelming majority of whom are Black, and the particular injustice of serving a
sentence that society has come to decry as unjust and racist.37 Of

31. Id.
32. First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b), 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing
Act).
33. Id. § 404(a). This includes sentencing for crack cocaine offenses under the 100:1
ratio, or mandatory minimum imposed for simple possession of crack cocaine. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 3.
34. First Step Act of 2018 § 404(c) (“No court shall entertain a motion made under this
section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced
in accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 (Public Law 111-220; 124 Stat. 2372) or if a previous motion made under this section
to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete
review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a
court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”).
35. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCE AND PRISON IMPACT ESTIMATE SUMMARY
(2019) [hereinafter IMPACT SUMMARY], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/prison-and-sentencing-impact-assessments/January_2019_Impact_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BFE-HL59].
36. For example, the First Step Act’s highest impact section is 102(b), pertaining to
good-time credit and prerelease custody, which affects 142,448 offenders. Id.
37. See, e.g., Mark J. Perry & Gary J. Schmitt, From 100-1 to 18-1: Improved Disparity
for Double-Standard, Racist, Minimum Drug Sentencing?, AEIDEAS: CARPE DIEM (Mar. 21,
2010), https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/from-100-1-to-18-1-improved-disparity-for-double-st
andard-racist-minimum-drug-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/84CV-SDCB].
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those 2660 prisoners, 89.1% are Black and 6.2% are Hispanic; only
4% are white.38
2. Congressional Intent
As embodied in the substance of the law, Congress’s intent in
passing the First Step Act was to decrease the prison population,
shorten sentences for drug crimes, and reduce the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing.39 The law
works to decrease the prison population by expanding the compassionate release program, increasing the number of safety valve applications for reduced sentences, making the Fair Sentencing Act
retroactive, and by implementing programs to reduce recidivism.40
The law shortens sentences for drug crimes by further reducing
mandatory minimums and changing the conditions under which
they apply.41 It does this by modifying the definitions for a mandatory minimum-triggering “serious drug felony” and “serious violent
felony.”42 Finally, the law expands efforts to reduce the disparity
between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing by making
the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive.43
Additionally, the First Step Act was shaped by the goals of the
United States Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”):
uniformity, proportionality, and reducing unjustified race-based
differences in sentencing.44 The Sentencing Commission worked
over the last twenty-five years to mobilize Congress to reform drug
sentencing by enacting policies of its own, making recommendations to Congress, and directly shaping legislation.45 The Sentencing Commission’s goal of uniformity in sentencing means treating
like offenders alike.46 Replacing the 100:1 ratio with the 18:1 ratio
serves uniformity by better reflecting the relative harm between
crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses. Proportionality in sentencing means treating different offenders differently based on the
38. IMPACT SUMMARY, supra note 35. For additional reference, 98.8% of those impacted
are male, and 97% are U.S. citizens. Id.
39. United States v. Simons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
40. INSIDER EXPRESS, supra note 21, at 1.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268 (2012).
45. See infra note 59.
46. Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 268.
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severity of their conduct.47 This is achieved by the First Step Act
in diminishing the reach of mandatory minimums, which restores
judicial discretion within the guidelines such that low-level drug
dealers can be sentenced less severely than major drug traffickers.48 Finally, applying the 18:1 ratio reduces unjustified racebased differences, because the overwhelming majority of people affected by the previous 100:1 scheme are Black.49
Taken together, Congress’s intent and the Sentencing Commission’s goals aspire to fundamental fairness in sentencing. Fundamental fairness is required of the federal government by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and it is measured “by that
whole community sense of ‘decency and fairness’ that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct.”50
The implementation of section 404 must be measured against fundamental fairness by assessing the factors of (1) the extent of sentence reduction, and (2) the degree to which it evaluates the petitioning prisoner as an individual. The sentence reduction factor
captures Congress’s intent to reduce the prison population and
shorten sentences for drug crimes, the Sentencing Commission’s
goal of uniformity, and the shared goal of reducing racial disparity
in sentencing. The individuality factor captures Congress’s goal of
reducing the prison population by assessing for likelihood of recidivism, the Sentencing Commission’s goal of proportionality, and
the shared goal of reducing racial discrimination in sentencing.
B. The First Step Act in Context
1. The War on Drugs
The First Step Act is the necessary culmination of the misguided
criminal justice policies implemented as part of the War on Drugs.
In a 1971 press conference, President Richard Nixon targeted drug
abuse as “public enemy number one” and declared war.51 Nixon’s

47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
51. Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,
1971 PUB. PAPERS 738, 738 (June 17, 1971) (“America’s public enemy number one in the
United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage
a new, all-out offensive.”).
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war “cast drug abuse and the drug offender as dangerous adversaries of the law-abiding public, requiring military-like tactics to
defeat.”52 Two years later in an address to Congress, President
Nixon created an agency dedicated to waging his war, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and celebrated that funding for drug
enforcement had increased sevenfold in the previous five years.53
Under President Reagan, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, making criminal sentencing a primary weapon for
cracking down on drug abuse.54 The Act reinstated a sentencing
regime which established highly punitive mandatory minimum
sentences based on drug weights.55 Amid a national panic about
the dangers of crack cocaine, Congress hastily passed the AntiDrug Abuse Act without a single committee hearing or congressional report.56 The national fear also prompted Congress to include the wildly disproportionate sentencing scheme which triggered crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentences for drug
weights 100 times less than powder cocaine.57 This 100:1 ratio disproportionately impacted Black communities, and ushered in the
era of mass incarceration.58

52. Exum, supra note 23, at 941.
53. Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973 Establishing
the Drug Enforcement Administration, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 228, 228–29 (Mar. 28, 1973).
54. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to
-4 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)).
55. Id. The first mandatory minimum sentencing laws for drug offenses were passed in
1951, but had grown unpopular by the 1960s. See Act of Nov. 2, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-255,
§ 1, 65 Stat. 767, 767–68 (amending the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act); Exum,
supra note 23, at 943. Ironically, Congress had repealed most of the mandatory minimums
with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in 1970, just one year
before President Nixon initiated the War on Drugs. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat.
1236, 1291–92 (1970).
56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 5–6 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/research/
congressional-reports/2002-report-congress-federal-cocaine-sentencing-policy [http://perm
a.cc/6BPP-ECZ5].
57. Id. at 4–5 (“As a result of the 1986 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) requires a five-year
mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time trafficking offense involving five grams or more
of crack cocaine, or 500 grams or more of powder cocaine, and a ten-year mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time trafficking offense involving 50 grams or more of crack cocaine,
or 5,000 grams or more of powder cocaine.”). The public hysteria has proven to be misplaced
as studies have shown that “[t]here are no pharmacological differences between crack [cocaine] and powder cocaine to justify their differential treatment under the law.” HART ET
AL., supra note 29, at 2.
58. 2002 REPORT, supra note 56, at 102–03. While the scope of this Comment is limited
to drug sentencing law, general crime bills like the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 also exacerbated the disparity by increasing the number of officers enforcing drug laws and by implementing three-strikes provisions. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
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For fifteen years, the Sentencing Commission decried the 100:1
ratio.59 In 1995, the Sentencing Commission began to report on the
ratio’s disparate impact, expressing concern that the law targeted
minority communities: “[m]ost strikingly, crack cocaine offenders
are 88.3 percent Black.”60 The Sentencing Commission warned
that the average sentence for a crack cocaine offense was twice as
long as the average sentence for a powder cocaine offense, and suggested that modification of the 100:1 ratio would “not only evaporate but would slightly reverse” the Black-white racial disparity in
sentencing.61
2. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
At last, in 2010, Congress acted upon the Sentencing Commission’s recommendation and reduced the 100:1 ratio. Under the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Congress reduced the sentencing disparity
between crack cocaine and powder cocaine to 18:1.62 The law increased the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger a five-year
mandatory minimum sentence from five grams to twenty-eight
grams, and the quantity required to trigger a ten-year mandatory
minimum from fifty to 280 grams.63 Despite these important reforms, the Supreme Court later held that the act would only apply
to those sentences issued after 2010, leaving in place all sentences
previously imposed under the unfair guidelines.64 In that case,
Dorsey v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized Congress
wrote the Fair Sentencing Act in response to “unjustified race-

Stat. 1796 (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 12601); see ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 56.
59. The Commission recommended modification of the 100:1 ratio in 1995, 1997, 2002,
2004, and 2007. Exum, supra note 23, at 950–51.
60. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 152–53 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT], https://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/199502-rt
c-cocaine-sentencing-policy/CHAP5-8.pdf [http://perma.cc/B4MR-ABXA]. Although crack
cocaine offenders are overwhelmingly Black, studies also show that people who are white
use crack cocaine at similar or higher rates as people who are Black. Exum, supra note 23,
at 954 (citing a study surveying crack users that found fifty-two percent were white and
thirty-eight percent were Black).
61. 1995 REPORT, supra note 60, at 152–54 (citing DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH
E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE
MATTER? 1–2 (1993)).
62. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). The Act also eliminated the mandatory minimum
sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine. Id. § 3.
63. Id. § 2.
64. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 279–81 (2012).
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based differences,” yet found that Congress only intended those
sentenced after August 3, 2010 to benefit from the less-prejudicial
sentencing scheme.65 The injustice of this temporal arbitrariness
was one of the issues the First Step Act of 2018 was designed to
remedy.
3. Relevant Changes in Law Since 2010
Since the Fair Sentencing Act took effect in 2010, sentencing law
has continued to change. Two of the changes most relevant to sentencing under the First Step Act are what crimes qualify for career
offender status, and the constitutionality of triggering a mandatory minimum based on conduct found by a judge instead of a jury.
The significance of these changes is best understood in the larger
context of how a court calculates a sentence.
Since 1987, when the Sentencing Commission promulgated the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, courts have applied a uniform sentencing method.66 The process includes three steps: (1) calculation
of the applicable offense level and criminal history score under the
Guidelines, (2) consideration of the policy statements and commentary to determine whether a departure is warranted, and (3) consideration of all applicable factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).67 In
application, at the first step, the court uses a table in the Guidelines to calculate a defendant’s sentencing range, accounting for
the offense level of the conviction, specific offense characteristics
that aggravate or mitigate that level, and the defendant’s criminal
history.68 The court then considers possible grounds for sentencing
outside of the Guideline range, including departures specific to the
65. Id. at 268, 279–81.
66. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 1–3 (2015) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-pu
blications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PV3U-KR45]. The Sentencing Commission was established as a part of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which responded to criticism over sentencing disparities
and widespread parole. See id. at 1; Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998). Although the Sentencing Commission is an independent body within the judicial branch, its
power is more akin to legislative power. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243
(2005) (“[T]he Commission is an independent agency that exercises policymaking authority
delegated to it by Congress.”).
67. FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra note 66, at 12. This is known as the Booker three-step
process. Id.
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
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defendant’s actual conduct in committing the offense, cooperation
with the government, and policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission.69 Finally, the court considers all seven factors of §
3553(a), including (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need
for the sentence to reflect retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the sentencing range calculated through the Guidelines; (5) policy statements promulgated by the Commission; (6) uniformity, “the need
to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities” among offenders
with similar records and offenses; and (7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims.”70
Although the offense of conviction determines the statutory minimum and maximum punishments, the defendant’s broader conduct is considered at steps one and three of calculating the sentence.71 This “real offense conduct” philosophy is the cornerstone of
the Guidelines system and requires that a defendant’s sentence reflect the defendant’s actual conduct, and not just the conduct for
which the defendant was convicted.72 As applied to drug sentencing, convictions embrace categories of conduct, such as possession
with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine, while
real conduct would include the actual drug weight possessed by the
defendant. The conviction imposes a mandatory minimum and a
statutory maximum punishment, but the drug quantity attributed
to the defendant is one of the specific offense characteristics that
aggravates the offense level in calculating the sentencing guidelines.
The first relevant changing area of law is at the intersection of
the Guidelines’ real offense conduct philosophy and the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. In 2013, in Alleyne v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the
mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the
jury,” and it must be included in the indictment.73 Because conduct
69. Id. § 1B1.1(b)–(c).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). The Supreme Court has recognized the redundancy of
some of the steps of the process, but has taken it to emphasize “the premise that district
courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007).
71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
72. FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra note 66, at 12–13.
73. 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). “The essential point is that the aggravating fact produced
a higher range which, in turn, conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct
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that increases a mandatory minimum also increases a statutory
maximum, this holding naturally followed from Apprendi v. New
Jersey.74 For example, in the drug context, statutory minimums
and maximums operate in brackets attached to the conviction: zero
to twenty years as a base that can be enhanced to five to forty years
or ten years to life depending on the quantity.75 Thus, an Alleyne
violation occurs where a judge imposes a mandatory minimum sentence based off of the real conduct of a quantity possessed that was
not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.76 This is a substantial development of law, which occurred after all prisoners who
were eligible for the First Step Act were originally sentenced. Because of the nature of drug offenses and real conduct sentencing,
many of these prisoners have significant discrepancies between the
drug quantity of convictions and the drug quantity attributed at
sentencing, which may raise Alleyne issues on resentencing.
A second relevant changing area of law is career offender status.
This factor aggravates the offense level and merits a near-maximum sentence. Under the Guidelines, a career offender is an adult
who commits a “crime of violence” or a controlled substance felony
after two prior felony convictions for those crimes.77 The Guidelines
assign all career offenders to the maximum criminal history category and to sentence ranges at or near the statutory maximum
penalty.78 However, an offender previously sentenced as a career
offender would likely receive a shorter sentence if sentenced today
for various reasons: the career offender guideline range is lower;
courts are now permitted to impose a sentence below the career
offender guideline range; and, many offenders would no longer be
classified as career offenders, either because the predicate offenses

and aggravated crime. It must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 115–16.
74. 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (holding that any fact that raises a statutory maximum
must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
75. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
76. Would the Supreme Court’s Decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013), Lead to a Lower Sentence Today?, DEFENDER SERVS. OFF. TRAINING DIVISION [hereinafter Federal Defender Training], https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/criminal_defense_
topics/essential_topics/sentencing_resources/clemency/clemency-would-alleyne-lead-to-low
er-sentence-today.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3M9-V2FS].
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
78. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS—CAREER OFFENDERS 1 (2019), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_
Career_Offender_FY18.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF4V-HKLD]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).
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previously counted separately are now considered a single sentence, or the offense is no longer a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s narrowing interpretation.79
The Court began restricting the definition of “crime of violence”
in 2004, but for years courts found several nonviolent offenses
qualified: “tampering with a motor vehicle, burglary of a nondwelling, fleeing and eluding, operating a motor vehicle without
the owner’s consent, possession of a short-barreled shotgun, carrying a concealed weapon, oral threatening, car theft, and failing to
return to a halfway house.”80 In narrowing its interpretation, the
Court has heightened the actus reus to require “violent force,”81
and the mens rea to require “purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct,” more than mere recklessness.82 Fifty-seven percent of
those eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act were originally sentenced as career offenders.83 In this dynamic area of law
where courts are frequently reclassifying crimes under the Supreme Court’s narrower interpretation of crimes of violence, most
will want to argue that they no longer qualify as career offenders
nor deserve the near-maximum punishment for the offense.
C. Problems in Implementing Section 404
While the First Step Act provided new statutory authority for
courts to apply the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively, it offered little guidance in how to do so.84 Courts are arbitrarily implementing
section 404 because it is written ambiguously. The provision’s language leaves two open questions for courts to decide: (1) whether
the court has the authority to impose a new sentence or only to
79. See How a Person Previously Sentenced as a “Career Offender” Would Likely Receive
a Lower Sentence Today, DEFENDER SERVS. OFF. TRAINING DIVISION [hereinafter Career Offender Training], https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/criminal_defense_topics/essential_
topics/sentencing_resources/clemency/clemency-how-a-person-sentenced-as-a-career-offend
er-would-receive-a-lower-sentence-today4-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KQM-RAJ3].
80. Id. at 16; see generally Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
81. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (“[V]iolent force—that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”); Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9.
82. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127–28 (2009); Begay v. United
States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–46 (2008).
83. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS
RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 8 (2020) [hereinafter RETROACTIVITY REPORT], https://www.
ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-stepact/20200203-First-Step-Act-Retro.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAU4-4FNL].
84. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at
*6 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
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modify the existing sentence, and (2) which updates in sentencing
guidelines and caselaw to apply, if any.85
In deciding the first issue, whether to impose a new sentence or
modify the existing sentence, courts must reconcile the language of
the text with existing, familiar procedures for resentencing appeals. Within a month of the First Step Act’s passage, the Sentencing Commission identified this question of scope as a preliminary
question for the courts to decide.86 Section 404(b) provides that “[a]
court . . . may . . . impose a reduced sentence.”87 On the one hand,
the word “impose” generally refers to the full plenary sentencing
procedure following a defendant’s conviction. When imposing a
sentence, a court “conduct[s] a full and thorough review of the evidence in the case.”88 This includes reviewing a presentence report
prepared by the probation office that details the conduct of the defendant and affords the defendant the opportunity to argue mitigating factors and introduce evidence.89 Imposing a sentence also
requires the court to consider a breadth of factors detailed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), ranging from policy statements from the Commission to the seriousness of the offense.90
On the other hand, the fact that the language only allows the
court to impose “a reduced sentence” suggests limitation on the
court’s authority.91 This directive sounds in a more limited sentence modification, which is generally available to prisoners as governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) independent of the First Step Act. In
contrast to the procedure for imposing a sentence, when a court
modifies a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c) it conducts a more limited review.92 A body of caselaw applying this section provides a
familiar guide for courts and the path of least resistance in implementing their new resentencing authority under the First Step

85. See, e.g., id. at *6–14.
86. See INSIDER EXPRESS, supra note 21, at 8 (“Courts will have to decide whether a
resentencing under the Act is a plenary resentencing proceeding or a more limited resentencing.”).
87. First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b), 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing
Act) (emphasis added).
88. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *8.
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
91. First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b) (emphasis added).
92. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *8–9.
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Act.93 Section 3582(c)(2) allows for modification of a sentence subsequent to a change in the Sentencing Guidelines, while §
3582(c)(1)(B) allows the court to “modify an imposed term of imprisonment” pursuant to statutory authority.94 The Supreme Court
interpreted § 3582(c)(2) in Dillon v. United States, emphasizing
that it “does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing”; rather,
the new sentencing court may defer to findings of the original sentencing court.95 This modification procedure significantly limits
the petitioner’s rights such that he has no right to a hearing, and,
even if he is granted one, he has no right to be present such that
he may argue his case or introduce evidence.96
In deciding the second issue, whether to resentence under the
legal landscape at the time of the original conviction or present
day, courts also face an interpretive quandary. Section 404(b) continues, “a court . . . may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections
2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the
time the covered offense was committed.”97 A court rigidly interpreting that provision will reason that because the law only mentions
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, those are the only
changes in the law which should be applied. That is to say, the
court will endeavor to travel back in time to the date of the original
conviction and apply the law of that date, modified only by sections
2 and 3, thereby applying sentencing practices that have since been
updated by Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and appellate
courts. On the other hand, a court taking a broader view of section
404 would read the express authority to apply sections 2 and 3 as
directly responding to and overruling Dorsey, which decided the
Fair Sentencing Act was not retroactive.98 Interpreting the law in
that context, section 404 is not a mandate to apply a time machine
93. See id. at *7, *9 (“[M]ost courts have applied the procedures under § 3582(c)(1)(B)
to motions for relief under the First Step Act.”).
94. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (“[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”), with
§ 3582(c)(1)(B) (“[T]he court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent
otherwise expressly permitted by statute . . . .”).
95. 560 U.S. 817, 825, 829 (2010).
96. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(4); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRIMER ON RETROACTIVITY
2–5 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2016_Primer_Retroactivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT54-FU97].
97. First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b), 18 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing
Act) (emphasis added).
98. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268 (2012).
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resentencing—the court requires no express authority from Congress to apply present-day law in sentencing a defendant.
As noted above, the sea change in sentencing law since 2010
bears particular significance for defendants originally sentenced as
career offenders, and those whose attributed drug weights varied
significantly from the weight of conviction. These two factors mandate mandatory minimums that may prevent the First Step Act
from providing any relief and thereby cause courts to deny petitions for resentencing without a hearing.
The open questions of imposing a sentence or modifying it, and
applying a time machine or present law, overlap such that a court
can implement section 404 in one of four different ways. In analyzing how these issues overlap, it is helpful to visualize them on a
grid. The x-axis represents the court’s decision whether to modify
the existing sentence or impose a new sentence. The y-axis represents the court’s decision whether to apply a time machine approach or resentence under present law. The axes intersect to depict four quadrants, each representing one of the four methods
presently being used to implement section 404.

Time
Machine

Method
I

Method
II

Impose
New Sentence

Modify
Sentence

Method
III

Method
IV

Present
Law
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In Method I, a court decides to impose a new sentence and apply
the time machine approach.99 In Method II, a court decides not to
impose a new sentence but to modify the existing one and to apply
the time machine approach.100 In Method III, the court decides to
modify the sentence and apply present law.101 Lastly, in Method
IV, the court decides to impose a new sentence and apply present
law. 102 The next Part of this Comment employs cases to illustrate
each method in application, evaluates them against fundamental
fairness, and argues Method IV is the best approach.
II. ANALYZING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 404
A. Method I: Impose a New Sentence Through Time Machine
Resentencing, Hegwood
United States v. Hegwood represents one of the few United
States Circuit Court decisions to interpret section 404.103 Hegwood
came to the Fifth Circuit on appeal from the Southern District of
Texas.104 The Fifth Circuit held that section 404 authorizes imposing a new sentence through a time machine approach.105
In 2008, Michael Dewayne Hegwood sold eight grams of crack
cocaine to a confidential informant, unwittingly recorded on audio
and video.106 Hegwood was charged with conspiracy and possession
with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine.107 He
pled guilty to the possession charge and, in 2010, after serving
twenty-seven months on a related state charge, was sentenced to
200 months (sixteen years, eight months) with five years of supervised release.108 At the time of sentencing, Hegwood qualified as a
career offender based on two prior drug offenses, and his sentence

99. See, e.g., United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, No. 8:08CR441, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592, at
*4–5 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2019).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at
*8–9 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Payton, No. 07-20498-1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292,
at *10–12 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2019).
103. 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019).
104. Id. at 414.
105. Id. at 418–19.
106. Id. at 415.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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was enhanced accordingly.109 After having two applications for resentencing denied, Hegwood was granted a resentencing hearing
under the First Step Act in 2019, and was resentenced to 153
months (twelve years, nine months).110 On appeal, Hegwood argued for a full plenary resentencing, which would apply the present
law that no longer classified him as a career offender, meriting a
sentence range of seventy-seven months (six years, five months) to
ninety-six months (eight years).111 The court did not grant a full
plenary resentencing.112
The Fifth Circuit agreed with Hegwood that section 404 authorized the imposition of a new sentence rather than the modification
of his existing one:
The district court’s action is better understood as imposing, not modifying, a sentence, because the sentencing is being conducted as if all
the conditions for the original sentencing were again in place with the
one exception. The new sentence conceptually substitutes for the original sentence, as opposed to modifying that sentence.113

Although the Fifth Circuit concluded section 404 required imposing a new sentence, the court likened the process to a § 3582(c)
modification because of the limitations it found in answering the
second issue.114
Next, the Fifth Circuit held that section 404 requires a time machine resentencing rather than the application of present law.115
According to its textual analysis, section 404 requires this approach because the only explicit basis for resentencing is “as if” the
Fair Sentencing Act was in effect at the time of the offense.116
Therefore, the court reasoned, “Congress did not intend that other
changes were to be made as if they too were in effect at the time of
the offense.”117 The court articulated its role according to the time
machine approach, saying “[t]he district court decides on a new
sentence by placing itself in the time frame of the original sentenc-

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 418–19.
Id. at 418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ing, altering the relevant legal landscape only by the changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.”118 With this limitation, the
court reasoned that section 404 is more like a § 3582(c)(2) modification than a plenary resentencing because the original sentencing
is only adjusted for compliance with sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act.119
For Hegwood, imposing a new sentence did not provide full relief
because the court applied the time machine approach. Ultimately,
Hegwood’s guideline sentencing range was reduced under the 18:1
ratio, but his sentence was still enhanced by career offender status.120 Had the court imposed a new sentence considering present
law, Hegwood would not qualify as a career offender, and his sentence would not be enhanced.121 For Hegwood, the time machine
approach meant the difference between serving four more years in
prison and being eligible for immediate release.
1. Evaluating Method I
Measured against the First Step Act’s purpose of fundamental
fairness in sentencing, Method I fails in the extent to which it reduces prisoners’ sentences. This factor reflects Congress’s goals for
the First Step Act to reduce the prison population and shorten sentences for drug crimes. It also accounts for the Sentencing Commission’s goal of uniformity in sentencing, and their shared goal in
eliminating racial disparity in sentencing. Method I fails to accomplish these goals because the time machine approach turns a blind
eye to the progress of case law and the statutory system, thereby
resentencing using the overly punitive legal landscape pre-2010.
Method I also fails in the degree to which it evaluates the petitioner as an individual. This factor reflects Congress’s goal of reducing the prison population by assessing for likelihood of recidivism, the Sentencing Commission’s goal of proportionality, and the
shared goal of reducing racial discrimination in sentencing. Although the court interpreted section 404 to require imposing a new
sentence, which would normally require a full evaluation of the petitioner’s character, context, and rehabilitation, the combination

118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010)).
120. Id. at 418–19.
121. Id. at 416.
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with the time machine approach did not yield this result. Because
of the time machine approach, the court reasoned the resentencing
was more like the general petition for sentence modification under
§ 3582(c) than a full plenary resentencing. Accordingly, Method I
defers to the findings of the trial court, denies the petitioner the
opportunity to put on new evidence, and to be present at his or her
resentencing to advocate for him or herself. Accordingly, Method I
fails to achieve fundamental fairness in sentencing; instead, it perpetuates the injustice the First Step Act was enacted to remedy.
As illustrated in Hegwood, Method I allows prisoners to be resentenced under an outdated scheme which has been updated precisely because it was found unjust.122 Although the court reduced
Hegwood’s sentence, it chose an interpretation of section 404 that
did not result in the greatest sentence reduction, clinging to the
text of the statute for justification. Hegwood advanced an argument for a full plenary resentencing that was equally based on the
text of the statute but also accounted for the larger purpose of the
First Step Act—fundamental fairness.123 We will see a minority of
courts are open to this interpretation in Method IV.
Hegwood illustrates one significant problem with the time machine approach: sentencing a person as a career offender though
they no longer qualify as one.124 As fifty-seven percent of prisoners
eligible for section 404 resentencing were originally sentenced as
career offenders, rejecting the time machine approach is a critical
step in fulfilling the purpose of the First Step Act.125 Career offender status is not the only problem that arises with the time machine approach. A second problem arises when the drug weight of
offense varies significantly from the weight attributed in the
presentence report.126 This issue arises in Haynes, where the court
applied Method II.

122. See Career Offender Training, supra note 79, at 1.
123. Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 417–18.
124. See Career Offender Training, supra note 79.
125. RETROACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 83, at 8.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at
*11–14 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
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B. Method II: Modify Existing Sentence Through Time Machine
Resentencing, Haynes
United States v. Haynes was decided by the District Court of Nebraska and illustrates Method II.127 The Haynes court held section
404 authorizes a sentence modification using the time machine
method.128 The facts of Haynes give rise to the important issue of
whether to resentence the defendant according to the drug weight
of conviction or as attributed in the presentence report.129
Willie Haynes pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
five or more grams of crack cocaine.130 Haynes did not object to the
weight attributed to him in the presentence report, which held him
responsible for 28.35 grams.131 Under the 100:1 ratio, Haynes’s
conviction of five or more grams carried a mandatory minimum of
five years.132 This mandatory minimum was increased to ten years
because of prior felony drug convictions.133 Additionally, Haynes’s
sentencing guideline range was enhanced as a career offender,
from 262 months (twenty-one years, ten months) to 327 months
(twenty-seven years, three months).134 For a reason unnoted in the
opinion, the sentencing court made a downward variance and sentenced Haynes to 188 months (fifteen years, eight months) with
eight years of supervised release.135 Haynes initially moved pro se
for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, but was denied.136 Fortunately, the court did not consider that motion to be a
review on the merits and allowed Haynes to refile with representation of the Federal Public Defender.137 Haynes argued the 18:1
ratio would reduce his sentencing range to 188 months (fifteen
years, eight months) to 235 months (nineteen years, seven
months).138 Additionally, he requested a downward variance of
twenty-eight percent from the lower end of that range, as had been
127. United States v. Haynes, No. 8:08CR441, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592 (D. Neb.
Mar. 28, 2019).
128. Id. at *4–5.
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *1–2.
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *2–3.
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *3.
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granted in his original sentencing.139 This would merit a resentencing to 135 months (eleven years, three months).140
First, the Haynes court held that section 404 requires a sentence
modification rather than the imposition of a new sentence.141
Haynes argued that section 404(b)’s language giving courts the
power to “‘impose’ a reduced sentence” distinguished the resentencing process from a mere modification.142 The court “s[aw] no basis
for that distinction,” implying that a § 3582(c)(1)(B) modification
pursuant to statute was the correct procedural tool.143 The court
noted that the defendant did not have the right to be present at
such a proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
43(b).144
Subsequently, the Haynes court held that section 404 authorizes
the time machine approach to resentencing.145 As applied to
Haynes’s circumstances, where the drug weight attributed to him
in the presentence report varied significantly from the weight of
offense, this meant a complete denial of his petition.146 The Fair
Sentencing Act, under the new 18:1 ratio, increased the weight required to trigger a five-year mandatory minimum from five grams
of crack cocaine to twenty-eight grams of crack cocaine.147 Here,
the court decided that Haynes’s conviction would be unaltered by
the Fair Sentencing Act because he had been attributed with 28.35
grams in the presentence report, an amount requiring the same
mandatory minimum as his original sentence.148 Thus, the court
ultimately denied Haynes’s motion to reduce sentence.149

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *5.
142. Id. (quoting First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b), 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair
Sentencing Act) (emphasis added)).
143. Id. at *5.
144. Id. at *4–5.
145. Id. at *4.
146. Id. at *1–2, *5.
147. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
148. Haynes, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592, at *4 (“[T]he government charged the offense
in Count II of the Indictment in accordance with the wording of the statutes as they existed
at the time of the Indictment. If the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time of
the Indictment, the underlying and undisputed facts demonstrate that the government still
would have charged Haynes under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).”).
149. Id. at *5.
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1. Evaluating Method II
As illustrated in Haynes, Method II fails the First Step Act’s pursuit of fundamental fairness in sentencing. It first fails in the extent to which it reduces prisoners’ sentences. In Haynes’s case, and
many others where the drug weight attributed in the presentence
report is greater than the amount of the conviction by a factor of
5.56 or more, Method II completely denies resentencing.150 This decision is reached by the application of the time machine method,
such that the court may resentence based off of judge-found facts,
the real conduct of petitioner’s drug quantity, while ignoring Alleyne because it had not been decided at the time of conviction. Additionally, the fact that Haynes pled to five grams but failed to object to the judge’s finding of 28.35 grams does not obviate his
Alleyne claim. A petitioner has the right to remain silent during
his sentencing and that cannot be taken as an admission.151 Thus,
Method II fails to reduce the prison population, fails to shorten
sentences for drug crimes, and fails to reduce unwarranted racebased sentencing disparities.
Additionally, Method II fails to evaluate petitioners as individuals. This is inherent in choosing to modify a sentence rather than
impose a new sentence. In modifying a sentence, the court conducts
a limited review, defers to the sentencing court’s findings, and denies the petitioner the right to attend the resentencing hearing.
Without granting the petitioner the basic human dignity of being
present to look the judge in the eye and make a case for his or her
rehabilitation, the court cannot fully weigh whether the petitioner
is likely to reoffend.152 Further, this modest review is only available
for petitioners who make it past Method II’s drug weight discrepancy threshold of 5.56. Otherwise, those petitioners receive no review at all. This fails to achieve the underlying goals of the First
Step Act of reducing the prison population by assessing for likelihood of recidivism, proportionality, and the reduction of racial discrimination in sentencing.153 While Method II fails to measure up
150. This factor is the amount the mandatory minimum triggering weights are increased
from a 100:1 ratio to an 18:1 ratio.
151. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326–30 (1999) (holding that a defendant
has the right to remain silent at sentencing and no negative inference may be drawn from
that silence in determining the facts).
152. See United States v. Rhines, No. 4:01-cr-310, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4–
5 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2019).
153. See discussion supra section I.A.2.
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to fundamental fairness in outcomes and treatment of petitioners,
its time machine approach to the drug weight discrepancy also implicates constitutional concerns.154 This issue is addressed in the
Method III case, United States v. Jones.
C. Method III: Modify Existing Sentence Under Present Law,
Jones
In United States v. Jones, the court implemented section 404
through Method III. The Jones court held that section 404 authorizes a sentence modification under present law.155 The facts of
Jones again raise the issue of a significant drug weight discrepancy
between the offense and the presentence report.156 Because Jones
rejects the time machine approach, it properly resolves the problem by resentencing according to the offense.157
In 2005, Kendall R. Jones was convicted of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine.158 Under the 100:1 ratio, this offense triggered a ten-year
mandatory minimum, which was doubled to twenty years due to a
prior drug conviction.159 However, the presentence report attributed 367.4 grams of crack cocaine on his conspiracy charge, aggravating his sentencing guideline range to 262 months (twentyone years, ten months) to 327 months (twenty-seven years, three
months).160 The court sentenced Jones to 300 months (twenty-five
years) with ten years of supervised release.161 Pursuant to action
by the Sentencing Commission, which reduced the guidelines for
Jones’s offense, Jones successfully petitioned for his sentence to be
reduced to the twenty-year mandatory minimum, which remained
unaltered.162 Jones filed for further resentencing under the First

154. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *10, *14
(E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
156. Id. at *4.
157. Id. at *14.
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *5.
162. Id.
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Step Act arguing that retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act eliminated the twenty-year mandatory minimum.163 The
court agreed.164
First, the Jones court held that section 404 requires a sentence
modification rather than imposing a new sentence.165 The court
reasoned, like the Haynes court, that a First Step Act resentencing
fell squarely within a § 3582(c)(1)(B) modification, which allows
courts to modify a sentence “to the extent . . . expressly permitted
by statute.”166 The court also noted that the First Step Act only
permits courts to impose “a reduced sentence.”167 Thus, the court
reasoned, the scope of resentencing is limited, like a § 3582(c) modification, rather than a plenary resentencing.168
Next, the Jones court rejected the time machine approach in favor of resentencing under present law.169 For Jones, this carried
special significance because the drug weight attributed to him in
the presentence report, 367.4 grams, would still trigger the same
twenty-year mandatory minimum. This is because 367.4 grams exceeded the new ten-year mandatory minimum triggering weight,
280 grams, which would then be enhanced by his prior conviction.170 If the court applied the time machine approach, Jones’s unaltered mandatory minimum would disqualify him for relief, as
seen in Haynes.171 However, the court rejected the time machine
approach, characterizing the government’s argument about what
it would have charged had the Fair Sentencing Act been in place
at the time of conviction as “speculative and hypothetical.”172
Thus, the court modified Jones’s sentence based off of the offense, fifty grams, rather than the quantity attributed in the
presentence report.173 The court supported this decision by noting

163. Id.
164. Id. at *16.
165. Id. at *6–10.
166. Id. at *9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B)).
167. Id. at *9–10 (quoting First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b), 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing Act)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at *10–14.
170. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
171. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *11; see United States v. Haynes, No.
8:08CR441, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592, at *4–5 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2019).
172. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *12–13.
173. Id. at *13–14; see, e.g., United States v. Outler, No. 1:06-cr-291, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 215940, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2019).
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that the language of the First Step Act applies to “covered offense[s],” as opposed to conduct.174 The Jones court held, “[t]he covered offense is the charge of conviction—the charge in the indictment.”175
Resentencing based on the offense rather than the attributed
conduct is not only a rejection of the time machine approach on
grounds of speculation, but an insistence upon following present
Supreme Court precedent in Alleyne v. United States.176 Alleyne
was decided in 2013, after Jones was convicted.177 Alleyne extended
Apprendi v. New Jersey to hold that “any fact that increases the
mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ [of the crime] that must be
submitted to the jury,” and thus proven beyond a reasonable doubt
by the government.178 This requirement flows from the Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury in conjunction with the Due
Process Clause.179
As applied to the drug weight controversy, only the weight
charged in the language of the offense and conviction is found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.180 The amount attributed to the
defendant in the presentence report and factored in at sentencing
is found by a judge by a lower standard, a preponderance of the
evidence.181 Thus, under Alleyne, it would be unconstitutional to
resentence a defendant based off of the amount attributed in a
presentence report, because a jury did not find that element beyond a reasonable doubt.182
Accordingly, the court resentenced Jones based upon fifty grams
of crack cocaine, the amount in the indictment.183 Although fifty
grams still triggered a mandatory minimum under the 18:1 ratio,

174. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *12 (quoting First Step Act of 2018 §
404(a), 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing Act)).
175. Id.
176. 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
177. Id.; see Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *4.
178. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (holding
that any fact that increases the maximum sentence is an element of the crime which must
be found by the jury).
179. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 104–05.
180. See FEDERAL SENTENCING, supra note 66, at 4.
181. See id. at 12–13.
182. See Federal Defender Training, supra note 76, at 5–8.
183. United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *12–13,
*16 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
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that minimum was only ten years.184 Ten years was less than his
new sentencing range, 168 months (fourteen years) to 210 months
(seventeen years, six months), and, more importantly, less time
than he had already served.185 At the time of resentencing, Jones
had served 175 months (fourteen years, seven months) of his
twenty-year sentence.186 The court modified Jones’s sentence to
time served with eight years of supervised release.187 The court
gave the Bureau of Prisons ten days to process Jones’s release, and
then Jones was freed.188
1. Evaluating Method III
Measured against the First Step Act’s aspiration of fundamental
fairness in sentencing, Method III comes close to passing.189 As
seen here in the case of Kendall Jones, Method III reduces prison
sentences to the full legal extent and favors immediate release
where appropriate.190 This advances the underlying goals of reducing the prison population, shortening sentences for drug crimes,
and combatting racial disparity in sentencing, thus restoring justice to those punished under an overly punitive scheme.191 Method
III achieves these goals by rejecting the time machine approach,
thereby refusing to speculate about whether the petitioner would
have been charged and convicted of a greater offense under the new
18:1 ratio.
However, Method III fails fundamental fairness in sentencing by
failing to evaluate the petitioner as an individual. Fundamental
fairness is not satisfied by mere outcomes, but by a process that
attends to the injustice served upon each petitioner. By deciding
that section 404 requires a sentence modification pursuant to §
3582(c)(1)(B), the court violates the petitioner’s basic dignity in
denying him or her the right to be present.192 This contravenes the
spirit of the First Step Act, a reform concerned with remedying
184. Id. at *16.
185. Id. at *16–17.
186. Id. at *5.
187. Id. at *17.
188. Id.
189. See discussion supra section I.A.2.
190. See Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *17.
191. See discussion supra section I.A.2.
192. See United States v. Rhines, No. 4:01-cr-310, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4–
5 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2019).
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decades of racial injustice.193 Although the Jones court took care to
consider Jones’s post-sentence conduct, and his rehabilitation appeared to sway the court in resentencing him to time served, there
is no guarantee that other courts applying Method II or III modifications would consider those factors.194 The only way they are
guaranteed to be considered is in a full plenary resentencing,
where the petitioner can fully allocute before the court. The First
Step Act does not direct the court to consider those factors, nor is
it required by the general sentence modification statute in §
3582(c)(1)(B).195 Instead, the language of the First Step Act requires consideration of post-sentence conduct by directing a court
to “impose a reduced sentence.”196 The word impose, rather than
modify, requires the court to consider the § 3553(a) factors, which
is the only way to guarantee a court will consider the defendant’s
rehabilitation, character, and context.197 By imposing a new sentence under present law, the court favors the greatest reduction in
sentence and recidivism.
Method III also illumines a fundamental problem with applying
the time machine approach: it resentences the defendant with an
unconstitutional method justified on the thin rationale that section
404 requires the court to pretend that the Supreme Court has not
decided Alleyne yet.198 This problem exists in Method II, illustrated
in Haynes above, but would equally taint a Method I application
should the pertinent discrepancy between convicted and attributed
drug weights be present.199 Thus, Jones introduces us to the constitutional concerns latent in Methods I and II.200 The time machine approach also raises problems where the defendant was sentenced as a career offender, as illustrated in Hegwood’s

193. See discussion supra section I.A.2.
194. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *14–17.
195. See First Step Act of 2018 § 404, 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (Application of Fair Sentencing
Act); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
196. First Step Act of 2018 § 404(b) (emphasis added).
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *7–8; supra note
70 and accompanying text.
198. See Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *13 (“[T]he government’s ‘argument
that a defendant is not eligible because the sentencing court might have elected to calculate
his statutory penalties in a way that now is unlawful, and back then would have been illogical, is unpersuasive.’” (quoting United States v. Glore, 371 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532 (E.D. Wis.
2019))).
199. See United States v. Haynes, No. 8:08CR441, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592, at *4
(D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2019).
200. See Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *13–14.
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implementation of Method I.201 This issue is fully illumined and
resolved in Payton’s application of Method IV.
D. Method IV: Impose a New Sentence Under Present Law,
Payton
United States v. Payton implements section 404 through Method
IV.202 The Payton court held that section 404 requires the court to
impose a new sentence while following present-day caselaw and
sentencing guidelines.203 The combination of these decisions
amounts to a full plenary resentencing. The facts of Payton illustrate Method IV’s resolution of the problems arising from resentencing a career offender.204
In 2008, Earl Payton pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more
of crack cocaine.205 Because Payton had three prior breaking and
entering convictions and one prior felony drug conviction, he was
deemed a career offender warranting a twenty-year mandatory
minimum.206 However, his sentencing guideline range was higher:
262 months (twenty-one years, ten months) to 327 months (twentyseven years, three months).207 The court imposed a sentence of 300
months (twenty-five years).208 Eleven years later, Payton moved to
be resentenced under the First Step Act.209
First, the court held that section 404 requires courts to impose a
reduced sentence rather than modify the existing one.210 In reaching this conclusion, the court conducted a textual analysis, beginning with the plain language of the statute.211 The court found it

201. See United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2019).
202. United States v. Payton, No. 07-20498-1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292 (E.D. Mich.
July 2, 2019).
203. Id. at *10–12.
204. Id. at *12.
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *10.
211. Id.
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significant that section 404(b) uses the word “impose” in instructing it to reduce the defendant’s sentence.212 This distinguishes section 404 from a § 3582(c)(2) modification, which does not “impose a
new sentence in the usual sense.”213 The court was persuaded by
Payton’s argument that “the only way to impose a reduced sentence [was] to consider the § 3553(a) factors and Guidelines, including the defendant’s record in prison.”214
Further, the court emphatically rejected the time machine approach: “The Court will not turn a blind eye to the changes in the
law and Guidelines which have gone into effect since 2008.”215 For
the Payton court, this issue is part and parcel to the decision to
impose a new sentence: “[T]he First Step Act vests the Court with
broad discretion to resentence defendants considering the
§ 3553(a) factors, including the case law and Guidelines in effect
today.”216 For Payton, application of the Guidelines in effect at his
resentencing meant that he was no longer classified as a career
offender, reducing his mandatory minimum from twenty years to
ten years.217 His sentencing range thus became 120 months (ten
years) to 137 months (eleven years, five months).218
1. Evaluating Method IV
Method IV uniquely fulfills the purpose of the First Step Act in
seeking fundamental fairness in sentencing.219 It reduces prisoners’ sentences to the greatest appropriate extent by removing career offender barriers where the law has changed. Thus, it satisfies
the goal of reducing the prison population, favoring immediate release where appropriate, shortening prison sentences, and reducing racial disparity in sentencing.

212. Id.
213. Id. (citing United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795, 797 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 9, 2019)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at *11.
216. Id. at *9.
217. Id. at *12. In 2016, the Sentencing Commission narrowed the definition of a crime
of violence and excluded burglary of a dwelling, the offense which had made Payton a career
offender in 2008. Id. at *12 n.3.
218. Id. at *12. At a subsequent plenary sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Payton
to 180 months (fifteen years). Amended Judgment at 2, Payton, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110292 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2019) (No. 07-20498-1). It is unclear from the record what justified his upward variance from the guidelines range.
219. See discussion supra section I.A.2.
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Additionally, Method IV advances fundamental fairness by the
comprehensive approach it takes to evaluating each petitioner as
an individual. By imposing a new sentence under present law, the
court conducts a full plenary resentencing, which requires a full
review of the petitioner’s context, character, and conduct along
with the § 3553(a) factors. Not only does Method IV reevaluate all
of the information before the court, it grants the petitioner the
right to present their petition in person, preserving basic human
dignity. This will not completely cure the injustice of serving an
overly punitive and racist sentence, but it is a necessary first step
toward full remedy. This satisfies the goal of reducing the prison
population by fully assessing each petitioner for likelihood of recidivism. It advances the eradication of unjustified race-based disparities in drug sentencing and it advances proportionality by allowing courts to exercise discretion to sentence low-level drug
offenders less severely than major drug traffickers.220 The Payton
court acknowledged Method IV’s coherence with the First Step Act:
This interpretation is in keeping with the purposes of the First Step
Act which was enacted, in part, to: provide a remedy for individuals
subjected to overly harsh and prejudicial penalties for crack cocaine
offenses; decrease the number of people caged in our overcrowded prisons largely because of the War on Drugs; and save taxpayer dollars.221

Further, Method IV cures the career offender problem by rejecting the time machine approach.222 As seen in Hegwood’s implementation of Method I, imposing a new sentence with the time machine
approach leaves unjust mandatory minimums in place.223 Instead,
with the plenary resentencing of Method IV, the court considers
the updated guidelines and reevaluates the factors which aggravate or mitigate the sentence.224 This is fair and just, and comports
with the purpose of the First Step Act. As the Payton court put it,
“Applying outdated and prejudicial Guidelines would subvert both
Congress’s intent in passing the Act and the Court’s duty to get
things right.”225

220. See discussion supra section I.A.2.
221. Payton, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292, at *11.
222. See id.
223. United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2019).
224. Payton, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292, at *11–13.
225. Id. at *11.

PEYTON 544 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

10/5/2020 1:00 PM

RETROACTIVE JUSTICE

1197

Additionally, Method IV cures the drug weight problem by rejecting the time machine approach.226 Similar to the Method III
modification, as seen in Jones, Method IV requires resentencing
based upon the drug quantity of the offense, not the attributed conduct.227 For example, in United States v. Dodd, Anthony Timothy
Dodd was held responsible for over fifty grams of crack cocaine in
his conviction, but his presentence report attributed him with 1.5
kilograms.228 Implementing Method IV, the court first chose to impose a new sentence, asserting that the theory that section 404 requires modification “rests on a misplaced equivalency with sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a narrow avenue
limited by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.”229 Next the court rejected the time machine approach, refusing to engage in a speculative series of hypotheticals, and obviating the Sixth Amendment
violations that would arise in resentencing based off the presentence report.230 The court resentenced Dodd based off of his conviction of fifty grams, which triggered the 18:1 ratio’s five-year mandatory minimum for possessing more than twenty-eight grams,
and then calculated his sentencing range factoring in his conduct,
including the 1.5 kilograms attributed to him, to merit a new sentence of fifteen years. This case illustrates how a plenary resentencing advances proportionality: an offender who possesses a
quantity much greater than the mandatory minimum can be punished more severely than a lesser offender, while still receiving a
sentence that is fundamentally fair. Fifteen years was a profound
relief from his original pre-Fair Sentencing Act sentence—a mandatory minimum of life in prison.231

226. Id.
227. See United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *11–
14 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
228. United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795, 796–97 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
229. Id. at 797. The court also rejected the modification section relied on by Jones in
Method III, § 3582(c)(1)(B): “As section 404 of the First Step Act authorizes a reduction in
sentence by its own terms, it would be effective even absent the existence of 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(B) as complementary authority.” Id. at 797 n.2.
230. Id. at 797–98 (“The First Step Act, however, applies to offenses and not conduct.
. . . Both Apprendi and Alleyne are binding on this Court for sentencings held today. That
these procedural rules do not trigger a right to relief retroactively on collateral review, see
Walker v. United States, 810 F.3d 568, 574–75 (8th Cir. 2016), is distinct from whether they
apply to proceedings independently authorized under the First Step Act.”).
231. Id. at 796, 800. The mandatory life sentence was so offensive, in fact, that ten years
after being sentenced, Dodd’s sentence was commuted by President Obama to twenty years.
Id. at 796. The First Step Act shows that a further reduction of five years was still appropriate and fair.
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The Payton court did not confront the drug weight disparity issue, but its logic in rejecting the time machine approach applies
with equal force.232 Payton cited support from United States v.
Stone, which said, “[t]he First Step Act neither directs nor implies
that the Court should perpetuate the application of an unconstitutional practice when determining a new sentence that complies
with the Act’s directives.”233
E. Comparison
Comparing Methods I–IV reveals that application or rejection of
the time machine approach has a greater impact on the fundamental fairness of a section 404 resentencing than whether the court
chooses to impose a new sentence rather than modify. This is because the time machine approach has the potential to completely
deny a petition based on outdated mandatory minimums triggered
by career offender status or a significant discrepancy in drug
weights. Thus, Methods III and IV are more fundamentally fair
than Methods I and II, precisely because Methods III and IV reject
the time machine approach and sentence under present law. However, imposing a new sentence is a more just implementation of
section 404 than a sentence modification because only imposing a
new sentence requires the court to fully evaluate the petitioner as
an individual who is present and allocuting before the court such
that it may consider his character, context, and conduct, along with
all of the § 3553(a) factors.234 In this regard, Method IV surpasses
Method III. Accordingly, only Method IV fully coheres with the
purpose of the First Step Act in achieving fundamental fairness in
sentencing.
The matrix below illustrates the overlap of the more fundamentally fair approaches, imposing a new sentence under present law,
with added weight for the time machine issue. The import of applying present law is portrayed by a heavier gray than the imposition of a new sentence. Graphically, the darker the method, the
better approach to implementing section 404 it is. Thus, though

232. United States v. Payton, No. 07-20498-1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292, at *11
(E.D. Mich. July 2, 2019).
233. Id. (citing United States v. Stone, No. 96-cr-403, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99457, at
*7 (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2019)).
234. See United States v. Rhines, No. 4:01-cr-310, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4–
5 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2019).
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Method I and Method III each answer one issue correctly and one
issue incorrectly, Method III yields the better outcome because it
rejects the time machine approach.235 Ultimately, Method IV
uniquely serves the First Step Act’s purpose of fundamental fairness in sentencing, as illustrated by its darkest gray.

Time
Machine

Method
II

Method
I
Impose
New Sentence

Modify
Sentence

Method
III

Method
IV

Present
Law
The court’s decision of which method to apply is not an academic
distinction, but is measured in days, months, and years of peoples’
lives spent unnecessarily incarcerated. Consider, again, Michael
Dewayne Hegwood. At the time he moved to be resentenced under
the First Step Act, Hegwood had been in prison for 108 months
(nine years) on a crack cocaine offense.236 Hegwood still had ninetytwo months (seven years, eight months) to serve on his 200-month
(sixteen years, eight months) sentence, which had been enhanced
by “career offender” status.237 If the court applied Method IV and
imposed a new sentence under today’s law he would no longer be
classified as a career offender and his sentencing guideline range
would therefore be seventy-seven months (six years, five months)
235.
236.
237.

See discussion supra section II.C.1.
United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 415–16 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id.
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to ninety-six months (eight years).238 Hegwood would be eligible for
immediate release.239 However, because the court applied Method
I and imposed a new sentence using the time machine approach,
Hegwood was still classified as a career offender and sentenced to
153 months (twelve years, nine months).240 While that is almost
four years less than his original sentence, it still leaves Hegwood
in prison for four more years.241 This is especially harsh knowing
that today’s guidelines assert that the nine years he has already
served is somewhere between twelve and thirty-one months longer
than is merited by his offense.242
There are 2660 prisoners eligible for relief under section 404.243
If Hegwood’s case is representative of half of those prisoners, even
after Method I resentencing, they will serve over 9400 years more
than they would if resentenced under Method IV.244 At a cost of
$36,000 a year to detain a prisoner, American taxpayers would pay
an extra $338.4 million to unnecessarily and unjustly incarcerate
crack cocaine offenders.245 Even if Hegwood was representative of
only a quarter of those prisoners, 4700 excess prison years would
be a gross injustice, worthy of national outcry and congressional
remedy. To Michael Hegwood, four more years in custody is a cruel
failure of justice, worthy of remedy. Unfortunately for him, the
Fifth Circuit upheld his resentencing, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.246
While choosing the wrong implementation method is a discrete
injury to an individual prisoner, the existence of four different
methods of implementing section 404 is a systemic injustice yielding arbitrary results that undermines the goals of sentencing re-

238. Id. at 416.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 416, 418–19.
241. Id. at 415–16.
242. Id. at 416.
243. IMPACT SUMMARY, supra note 35.
244. This calculation is my own and based off of the total number of prisoners eligible
for relief, 2660, with an average sentence of 258 months, receiving a 23.5% sentence reduction like Hegwood under Method I when eligible for a 56.5% sentence reduction under
Method IV, like Hegwood. Cf. Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 416; IMPACT SUMMARY, supra note 35
(total number of eligible offenders); RETROACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 83, at 9 (average
sentence).
245. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,863, 18,863
(Apr. 30, 2018) ($36,299.25 average in FY 2017).
246. Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 419, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 285 (2019).
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form. In advocating for the First Step Act, the Sentencing Commission aspired to three goals: uniformity, treating like offenders
alike; proportionality, treating different offenders differently (e.g.,
major drug traffickers and low-level dealers); and eradicating unjustified race-based differences in sentencing law.247 None of these
can be achieved while courts continue to resentence prisoners arbitrarily under four different methods. The haphazard implementation of section 404 is further contrary to the policy goals of Congress. In the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and the First Step Act of
2018, Congress made strong policy statements prioritizing decreasing the prison population, shortening sentences for drug
crimes, and reducing the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing.248 For the 2387 prisoners who have already
been resentenced, and the 273 remaining, their sentence will never
be fundamentally fair so long as courts continue to implement four
different methods.249 Therefore, Congress should act to amend section 404.
III. PROPOSED FIRST STEP ACT AMENDMENT
As it is written, section 404 of the First Step Act fails to give
courts sufficient guidance to achieve the purposes of the Act. Although the statute directs a resentencing court to “impose” a new
sentence, the fact that it must be a “reduced sentence” suggests
something more akin to the familiar mechanism of statutory resentencing under § 3582(c) and pulls courts toward modification.250
Further, the directive to resentence “as if sections 2 and 3 of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect” tempts some courts to
resentence via imaginative exercises in time travel which ignore
significant constitutional precedent.251 Resultantly, section 404’s
ambiguous language has manifested the four different methods of
implementation in use in the district courts.252 To achieve fundamental fairness in resentencing crack cocaine offenders and fulfill

247. See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268 (2012).
248. United States v. Simons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
249. Cf. RETROACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 83, at 3–4 (petitioners resentenced through
Dec. 31, 2019); IMPACT SUMMARY, supra note 35 (total number eligible).
250. See United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *9–
10 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
251. See id. at *13–14; Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418–19.
252. See discussion supra section I.C.

PEYTON 544 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/5/2020 1:00 PM

1202

[Vol. 54:1165

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

the purpose of the First Step Act, Congress must amend the language of section 404 such that it requires courts to apply Method
IV.
An act of Congress is the best way to resolve the arbitrary implementation of section 404. Congress is the supreme lawmaking
body in the United States and any time it can be the authority to
implement or correct a law, it should.253 Article I of the Constitution vests Congress with “all legislative powers.”254 These powers
give congressional lawmakers the resources and institutional competence to craft intricate policies. 255 Further, for sentencing reform
to carry the most democratic legitimacy, change should be implemented by those officials directly elected by the people.256 While
the Supreme Court could intervene to rule that Method IV is the
correct interpretation, that is a less preferable solution and less
likely. The Court prefers issues to fully develop below before weighing in, and thus far only the Fifth Circuit has interpreted section
404. Further, the Court denied review on the Fifth Circuit case,
Hegwood.257 With a dwindling number of prisoners who qualify for
section 404 resentencing, the matter must be resolved urgently.258
It would take far too long for the Court to resolve this issue.
Section 404(b) should be amended as follows:
(b) Defendants previously sentenced. A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or
the court, impose a reduced sentence as if for covered offenses by applying sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law
111-220; 124 Stat. 2372) were in effect at the time the covered offense
was committed retroactively as a part of a full plenary resentencing,
adhering to all sentencing guidelines and case law current at the time
of the motion.

This proposed amendment first resolves the issue of whether to
impose or modify a sentence by expressly requiring a full plenary
resentencing. The plenary resentencing mandate itself implies the

253. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 788–89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislature is better positioned than a court to deal with emerging
issues).
256. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII.
257. Hegwood v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 285 (2019).
258. See RETROACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 83, at 4. (2387 offenders have already had
resentencing motions granted under the First Step Act).
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application of the law present to the motion, resolving the second
issue by rejecting the time machine approach.259 However, the
amendment further emphasizes the rejection of the time machine
approach by explicitly requiring the court to adhere to all sentencing guidelines and caselaw present at the time of the motion. In
addition, the full plenary sentencing encompasses a comprehensive review of the petitioner’s character, context, and conduct, such
that rehabilitative efforts would be accounted for in the new sentence.
Applying this amended section 404 to the facts of the Method I,
II, and III cases above results in a more just outcome, faithful to
the fundamental fairness purpose of the First Step Act. In the
Method I case, Hegwood, the court would still impose a new sentence on Hegwood, but instead of applying the time machine approach, the court would resentence under present law.260 Hegwood
would no longer be classified as a career offender and he would be
eligible for immediate release.261
Next, in the Method II case, Haynes, the court readily dismissed
the petition because it conducted a limited review under a sentence
modification.262 Further, the time machine approach allowed the
court to assume the government would have charged him with the
higher offense under the new drug weights, triggering the same
mandatory minimum, even though Haynes was not found to possess that amount beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.263 Under a
plenary resentencing, the court could not so handily dismiss the
case without a full review, including Haynes’s conduct in prison
and the § 3553(a) factors.264 Additionally, the court could not resentence Haynes with the drug weight attributed in the presentence report, because under Alleyne it would violate Haynes’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.265 Instead, he would be resentenced according to the five grams of crack cocaine he was convicted of possessing. There is no way of knowing what the outcome
of Haynes’s resentencing would be, but an amended section 404
259. See United States v. Jones, No. 3:04-cr-392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *8
(E.D. Va. June 19, 2019).
260. See United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019).
261. See id. at 416.
262. United States v. Haynes, No. 8:08CR441, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53592, at *4–5 (D.
Neb. Mar. 28, 2019).
263. See id. at *3–4.
264. See Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *8.
265. Id. at *13–14; see Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103.
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would at least ensure a full review in congruence with the purpose
of the First Step Act.
Finally, in the Method III case, Jones, there is less harm to remedy because the court rejected the time machine approach and
Jones’s sentence was modified to time served.266 However, an
amended section 404 would uphold the basic dignity of petitioners
seeking justice under the First Step Act by giving them the right
to be present and fully allocute at their resentencing.267 Further,
an amended section 404 would require courts to fully consider the
risk of recidivism by a mandated review of the prisoner’s postconviction conduct along with the § 3553(a) factors. All of these outcomes are more congruent with the purpose of the First Step Act
than the outcomes under Methods I, II, or III. By applying Method
IV to Hegwood, Haynes, and Jones, petitioners receive something
much closer to fundamental fairness in both the outcome and the
process of resentencing.
While the proposed amendment resolves the arbitrary implementation of section 404, the First Step Act has other outstanding
issues. One glaring issue is that while the First Step Act makes the
Fair Sentencing Act’s reforms retroactive in section 404, the First
Step Act fails to make its own reforms retroactive.268 This omission
perpetuates the injustice that the First Step Act purports to remedy in making the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. One remaining
issue within section 404 implementation is whether it infringes
upon executive privilege to resentence a defendant who has previously had their sentence commuted by the President.269 These issues merit their own study and responses but lie outside of the
scope of this Comment.
CONCLUSION
The First Step Act of 2018 is a significant step toward remedying the injustices of drug sentencing within our criminal justice
266. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216110, at *17.
267. See United States v. Rhines, No. 4:01-cr-310, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115868, at *4–
5 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2019).
268. See, e.g., Jamiles Lartey, Current Inmates Feel Left Behind by Trump’s Criminal
Justice Reform Bill, GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2018, 1:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2018/dec/21/trump-first-step-criminal-justice-reform-three-strikes [https://perma.
cc/CW2S-E59Z].
269. See, e.g., United States v. Razz, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1314, 1316–18 (S.D. Fla.
2019).
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system. The Act makes broad changes to prison programming,
reentry, and good-time credit towards the goal of reducing recidivism. It also introduces sentencing reforms to mandatory minimums to address overly punitive sentencing law. These reforms
work together to reduce the overall prison population and the resources required to maintain it. Additionally, in section 404 the
First Step Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive.
This allows prisoners sentenced under the old 100:1 crack cocaine
to powder cocaine sentencing scheme to be resentenced under the
less disproportionate 18:1 scheme. Unfortunately, section 404 is
written ambiguously such that district courts are implementing
the resentencing provision in four different ways. Section 404
leaves open the questions whether to impose a new sentence or
modify the existing one, and whether to do so under the law as it
existed at the time of the offense, modified only by the Fair Sentencing Act’s 18:1 ratio, or the law as it presently exists at the time
of the defendant’s motion for resentencing.
Only Method IV, imposing a new sentence under present law, as
exhibited in Payton, fully coheres to the purpose of the First Step
Act in achieving fundamental fairness in sentencing. Method IV
interprets section 404 to require a full plenary resentencing, which
gives the petitioner the right to attend his or her sentencing hearing, fully advocate for him or herself before the court, and requires
the court to consider the § 3553(a) factors, including the petitioner’s rehabilitation since conviction. This method also ameliorates constitutional concerns raised by a time machine approach,
which applies outdated sentencing guidelines and caselaw. This is
especially significant when offenders were originally classified as
career offenders and when there is a discrepancy in the drug
weight of the conviction and drug weight attributed in the presentence report. A full plenary resentencing effectuates the greatest
possible sentence reduction and fully evaluates the petitioner as
an individual, thereby achieving fundamental fairness in sentencing.
Therefore, Congress should amend section 404 to explicitly require a full plenary resentencing. As long as four different methods
are being used to implement section 404, uniformity in sentencing
cannot be achieved. This not only perpetuates the injustice of the
old sentencing regime where petitioners’ motions are denied, but
adds a new injustice of arbitrary resentencing under the First Step
Act. Congress should capitalize on the present bipartisan appetite
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for criminal justice reform to uniformly require full plenary resentencing under section 404. While the number of prisoners eligible
to be resentenced under this provision is a small fraction of the
prison population, the difference in method amounts to thousands
of prison years unjustly served and additional hundreds of millions
of dollars spent to perpetuate unjust incarceration. In the words of
Judge Weinstein, reflecting upon resentencing a defendant under
the First Step Act in the Eastern District of New York, “[a]n extra
year, day, or moment of freedom from prison, when warranted, is
worth pursuing by a prisoner, and, if justified by the law, should
be granted by the court. . . . justice favors freedom over unnecessary incarceration.”270
Daniel P. Peyton *

270. United States v. Simons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
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